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INTRODUCTION
“If there is one amendment, that is literally first among equals,
then it is truly the First Amendment.” 1 The First Amendment prohibits
prior restraints on speech, i.e., judicial suppression of material that
would be published or broadcast, on the grounds that it is libelous,
defamatory, or harmful. 2 However, the imposition of subsequent
liability for defamation does not abridge the freedom of speech
protected by the First Amendment. 3 It is this important distinction
drawn by the United States Supreme Court—subsequent punishment
vs. prior restraint—that denotes the permissible remedies and
punishments in a court of law for defamation. One question remains
unanswered by the Supreme Court: while the First Amendment allows
for after-the-fact punishment for defamation in the form of money
damages, or even imprisonment, does the First Amendment permit

∗ J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, May 2016.
1
Cailah E. Garfinkel, The Importance of an Independent Judiciary and a Free
Press, 22 SUM DEL. LAW. 28 (2004).
2
There are a few exceptions to the prohibition on prior restraint discussed infra
Part I.
3
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 301–02 (1964).
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permanent injunctions against published or spoken speech that has
been found to be defamatory by a judge or jury?
Permanently enjoining defamatory speech is preventing speech
before it happens. Traditionally, courts have consistently held that
“equity will not enjoin a libel.” 4 Put simply, money damages were the
only remedy available in a defamation lawsuit. The prevalence of
social media and Internet usage has changed the way our society
voices opinions. Defamatory comments, opinions, and articles can be
permanently placed in the virtual world with the click of a button. As a
result of this instantaneous communication platform, the number of
defamation lawsuits filed in the United States and around the world
has significantly increased. 5 In 2004, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Tory v. Cochran to decide whether a permanent injunction
is a constitutionally permissible remedy in a defamation case, “at least

4

Metro. Opera Ass'n, Inc. v. Local 100, Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Int'l
Union, 239 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2001); Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 677
(3d Cir. 1991) (“[T]he maxim that equity will not enjoin a libel has enjoyed nearly
two centuries of widespread acceptance at common law.”); Oakley, Inc. v.
McWilliams, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (noting that “never in the
216 year history of the First Amendment has the Supreme Court found it necessary
to uphold a prior restraint in a defamation case . . . .”).
5
Ian Burrell, Libel Cases Prompted by Social Media Posts Rise 300% in a
Year, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 19, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/homenews/libel-cases-prompted-by-social-media-posts-rise-300-in-a-year-9805004.html;
Roy Greensdale, 23% Increase in Defamation Actions as Social Media Claims Rise,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 2, 2014, 7:06 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/oct/20/medialaw-social-media;
Teresa Thompson, Internet Defamation Claims on the Rise as Online Reviews
Impact the Bottom Line, NETWORKED (Dec. 14, 2012),
http://www.networkedlawyers.com/internet-defamation-claims-on-the-rise-asonline-reviews-impact-the-bottom-line/.
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when the plaintiff is a public figure.” 6 Unfortunately, the Court never
reached the merits, as the plaintiff died after oral arguments. 7
In the 2015 case McCarthy v. Fuller, the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals became the second circuit court 8 to permit a lower court to
issue a permanent injunction in a defamation case. 9 In her concurring
opinion, Judge Diane Sykes recognized “[a]n emerging modern trend”
that acknowledges the general rule that equity does not enjoin libel,
but allows for the possibility of narrowly tailored permanent injunctive
relief as a remedy for defamation as long as the injunction prohibits
only the repetition of the specific statements found at trial to be false
and defamatory. 10 Judge Sykes sharply questioned this modern trend
because a defamatory statement in one circumstance, time, or place,
6

Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734, 736–38 (2005) (“ . . . Johnnie Cochran’s
death makes it unnecessary, indeed unwarranted, for us to explore petitioners’ basic
claims, namely, (1) that the First Amendment forbids the issuance of a permanent
injunction in a defamation case . . . .“). The Supreme Court did, however, vacate the
injunction as an overbroad, prior restraint on speech. Id. at 738.
7
Id. at 734.
8
In a 2-1 decision, the Sixth Circuit—with very terse reasoning—reversed a
district court’s decision not to issue an injunction against defamation. Lothschuetz v.
Carpenter, 898 F.2d 1200, 1208–09 (6th Cir. 1990) (Wellford, J. and Hull, J.,
dissenting).
9
McCarthy v. Fuller, 810 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2015). Both the First and Second
Circuits have declined to address the First Amendment arguments on the merits.
Metropolitan Opera Ass’n, Inc. v. Local 100, Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Int’l
Union, 239 F.3d 172, 174 (2d Cir. 2001) (striking down injunction as impermissibly
vague, but declining to address First Amendment arguments); Auburn Police Union
v. Carpenter, 8 F.3d 886, 904 (1st Cir. 1993) (leaving for another day the
determination whether a specific injunction constitutes an unlawful prior restraint).
The Fifth Circuit in Brown v. Petrolite Corp. allowed a lower district court to enjoin
an oil service company from further disseminating information related to tests and
samples that were the subject of a defamatory report about plaintiff’s products. 965
F.2d 38, 51 (5th Cir. 1992). However, the Fifth Circuit held that the lower court
could not enjoin “independent, reliable information that Petrolite may acquire in the
future,” so it is unclear exactly how the Fifth Circuit views permanent injunctions
against defamation. Id. The Fourth Circuit has held that injunctions on future speech
are impermissible prior restraints. Alberti v. Cruise, 383 F.2d 268, 272 (4th Cir.
1967).
10
McCarthy, 810 F.3d at 464 (Sykes, J., concurring).
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might not be defamatory in another circumstance, time, or place. 11 She
reiterated that permanently enjoining defamation does not account for
“constantly changing contextual facts that affect whether the speech is
punishable or protected.” 12
Supreme Court precedent appears to support the conclusion
that a permanent injunction against defamation violates the First
Amendment. The Court in Alexander v. U.S. stated, “Permanent
injunctions . . . that actually forbid speech activities[] are classic
examples of prior restraints” because they impose a “true restraint on
future speech.” 13 The First Amendment right to free speech is not
absolute; it “does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish,
without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted
and unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of
language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this
freedom.” 14 In any given case, "courts must balance free speech rights
against other strong social interests, including society's interest in
preventing and redressing attacks on reputation." 15 This balance
becomes particularly delicate in the context of defamation suits
because, at its core, “the first amendment prohibits the state from
interfering with the expression of unpopular, indeed offensive,
views.” 16
The First Amendment presupposes that the freedom to speak
one's mind is not only an aspect of individual liberty—and
thus a good unto itself—but also is essential to the common
quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole. Under
our Constitution, there is no such thing as a false idea.
11

Id. at 465.
Id.
13
Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993).
14
Gitlow v. People of State of N.Y., 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
15
ROGER LEROY MILLER & FRANK B. CROSS, THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
TODAY: BUSINESS IN ITS ETHICAL, REGULATORY, E-COMMERCE, AND GLOBAL
SETTING 119 (7th ed. 2013).
16
Nat’l Socialist White People’s Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010, 1016 (4th
Cir. 1973).
12
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However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its
correction not on the conscience of judges and juries, but on
the competition of other ideas. 17
This Comment examines the modern trend allowing the
issuance of permanent injunctions in defamation suits, despite the
longstanding maxim prohibiting such. Parts I and II will discuss the
Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence as it relates to
impermissible prior restraints and injunctions. Part II will discuss
Supreme Court decisions that struck down attempts by lower courts
and States to restrain speech. Part III analyzes recent state and federal
court decisions allowing narrow, permanent injunctions in defamation
cases, and argues that these decisions are erroneous and cannot be
reconciled with Supreme Court precedent. Next, parts IV and V
critically examine the Seventh Circuit’s decision in McCarthy v.
Fuller in which Judge Posner permitted an Indiana District Court to
issue a narrow, permanent injunction as a remedy in a defamation
lawsuit. Part V focuses on Judge Sykes’ concurring opinion, and
contends that her understanding of First Amendment jurisprudence—
as opposed to the majority’s— is correct. Lastly, part VI discusses
policy considerations that buttress the argument that injunctive relief
should not be available in defamation cases—mainly, that money
damages are an adequate remedy and permanent injunctions chill the
exercise of free speech.
I.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND PRIOR
RESTRAINTS ON SPEECH

The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .” 18 It is “no
longer open to doubt that the liberty of the press and of speech[] is
within the liberty safeguarded by the due process clause of the
17

Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504 (1984)
(citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323 (1974)).
18
U.S. CONST. art. I.
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Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action.” 19 The Supreme
Court has interpreted these guarantees to afford special protection
against orders that prohibit the publication or broadcast of speech that
impose a “previous” or “prior” restraint on speech. 20 A prior restraint
on speech is an administrative or judicial order forbidding certain
communications, publications, or other speech issued in advance of
the time that such communications, publications, or other speech are to
occur. 21 Prior restraints are “the most serious and the least tolerable
infringement on the First Amendment rights.” 22 When a court enters a
permanent injunction in a defamation action, such a remedy is
unquestionably a prior restraint on speech because it prevents speech
before it occurs. 23
However, the First Amendment’s prohibition on prior restraints
is not absolute. In 1931, the Supreme Court narrated three exceptions
to the prohibition on prior restraint: (1) the primary requirements of
decency may be enforced against obscene publications; (2) the
security of the community life may be protected against incitements to
acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government;
and (3) some overriding countervailing interest, such as when a nation
is at war and such speech is hindering the peace effort. 24 Prior
restraints, even within a recognized exception, will be extremely
difficult to justify, but “the purpose for which a prior restraint is
sought to be imposed ‘must fit within one of the narrowly defined
19

Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931).
Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556 (1976).
21
George Blum et al., Freedom from Prior Restraints and Censorship, 16A
AM. JUR. 2d CONST. L. § 472 (2015).
22
Metro. Opera Ass'n, Inc. v. Local 100, Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Int'l
Union, 239 F.3d 172, 176 (2d Cir. 2001).
23
Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (stating “permanent
injunctions . . . that actually forbid speech activities are classic examples of prior
restraints” because they impose a “true restraint in future speech.”); Procter &
Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 225 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that the
district court’s entering of three injunctive orders on planned publication was a
“classic case of a prior restraint.”).
24
Near, 283 U.S. at 716.
20
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exceptions to the prohibition against prior restraints.’” 25 These
exceptions are intended to be very narrow in light of the fact that “it
has been generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief
purpose of the First Amendment’s guaranty to prevent previous
restraints upon publication.” 26
Thus, the First Amendment strongly disfavors injunctions that
impose a prior restraint on speech. 27 Any prior restraint on expression
comes to a court with a heavy presumption against its constitutional
validity, and advocates have a weighty burden of showing justification
for the imposition of such a restraint. 28 Against this backdrop, the
Supreme Court has consistently refused to enjoin speech, finding that
after-the-fact punishment in the form of criminal imprisonment, fines,
or money damages is acceptable, 29 while prior suppression of speech
by injunction is not. 30
II. THE TRADITIONAL RULE: PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS IN
DEFAMATION CASES ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRIOR RESTRAINTS ON
SPEECH
Starting in 1800’s and continuing through the 20th century,
courts held firm in their conviction that injunctions in equity could
never restrain the publishing of defamatory speech, “however great the
25

Stuart, 427 U.S. at 592.
Id. at 588.
27
Metro. Opera Ass’n, 239 F.3d at 178.
28
Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
29
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 386 (1973) (citing N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)) (“[T]his Court
has held that the First Amendment does not shield a newspaper from punishment for
libel when with actual malice it publishes a falsely defamatory advertisement.”).
30
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931) (“In the present
case, we have no occasion to inquire as to the permissible scope of subsequent
punishment . . . . As has been noted, the statute in question does not deal with
punishments; it provides for no punishment, except in case of contempt for violation
of the court’s order, but for suppression and injunction-that is, for restraint upon
publication.”).
26
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injury” 31 and “even though such publications are calculated to injure
the credit, business, or character of the person aggrieved . . . he will be
left to pursue his remedy at law.” 32 Injunctions against speech were
not permitted in defamation cases under early English and American
common law, and the Supreme Court has never departed from this
precedent. 33
As early as 1839, the New York Court of Chancery (an equity
court) refused to stop the publication of a pamphlet that would have
defamed the plaintiff, holding that the publication of a libel could not
be enjoined “without infringing upon the liberty of the press, and
attempting to exercise a power of preventative justice which . . .
cannot safely be entrusted to any tribunal consistently with the
principles of a free government.” 34 The Chancery court alluded to the
ancient Court of Star Chamber in England 35 that had a habit of
restraining speech by injunction. 36 Since the Star Chamber had been
abolished, the Chancery court noted that only one court had issued an
injunction in anticipation of libelous speech, and “no judge or
chancellor . . . has attempted to follow that precedent.” 37 The court
reasoned that, if the defendants persisted in defaming the plaintiffs, the
victims were required to seek their remedies by a civil suit. 38
31

Am. Malting Co. v. Keitel, 209 F. 351, 354 (2d Cir. 1913).
Id.
33
Oakley, Inc. v. McWilliams, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1089–90 (C.D. Cal.
2012) (citing Erwin Chemerinsky, Injunctions in Defamation Cases, 57 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 157 (2007)).
34
Brandreth v. Lance, 1839 WL 3231 (N.Y. Ch. 1839).
35
The Court of Star Chamber was an English court made up of judges and
councilors that arose out of the medieval king’s council and supplemented the
regular justice of the common law courts. It was used by Charles I to enforce
unpopular political policies, and became a symbol of oppression to the parliamentary
and Puritan opponents of Charles. It was abolished in 1641. Court of Star Chamber,
BRITTANICA.COM, http://www.britannica.com/topic/Court-of-Star-Chamber (last
visited Feb. 17, 2016).
36
Brandreth, 1839 WL 3231, at *26.
37
Id. at *27.
38
Id. at *28-29.
32
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The United States Supreme Court has time and time again
struck down injunctions against defamation. The seminal case is Near
v. Minnesota ex rel Olson, where a newspaper appealed a permanent
injunction issued by the lower court after it determined that the
newspaper was “chiefly devoted to malicious, scandalous, and
defamatory articles” concerning certain individuals. 39 Minnesota law
deemed a “nuisance” any malicious, scandalous or defamatory speech
published by newspapers and other periodicals, and the Attorney
General could sue for suppression by way of an injunction any
newspaper it believed violated the law. 40 Because the suppression was
accomplished by enjoining future publication, the Court reasoned that
it “put the publisher under an effective censorship,” and was thus
unconstitutional. 41
This principle was echoed in Organization for a Better Austin
v. Keefe, in which a group of pamphleteers was enjoined from
protesting a real estate developer’s business practices. 42 Pertinently,
the Court held that, “the injunction, so far as it imposes prior restraint
on speech and publication, constitutes an impermissible restraint on
First Amendment rights.” 43 Further, the Court noted, “No prior
decisions support the claim that the interest of an individual in being
free from public criticism of his business practices in pamphlets or
leaflets warrants use of the injunctive power of a court.” 44
Similarly, in Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., the Court
invalidated a Texas nuisance statute that authorized courts, upon
finding that the defendant had shown obscene films in the past, to
issue an injunction of indefinite duration prohibiting the defendant
from showing any films in the future, including motion pictures that
had not been finally adjudicated to be obscene. 45 Absent “any
39

Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 706 (1931)
Id. at 701–02.
41
Id. at 712.
42
Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 417 (1971).
43
Id. at 418.
44
Id. at 419.
45
Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980).
40
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safeguards governing the entry and review of orders restraining the
exhibition of named or unnamed motion pictures, without regard to the
context in which they are displayed,” such an injunction could not be
upheld. 46
Many constitutional law scholars have gleaned from the
aforementioned Supreme Court holdings that injunctions on future
speech, even if preceded by the publication of defamatory material, are
unconstitutional. 47 Indeed, it would seem that this was the Court’s firm
conclusion in Near: even though the newspaper’s speech was chiefly
devoted to malicious, scandalous and defamatory material,
permanently enjoining future speech—even under those
circumstances—was unconstitutional.48 The Seventh Circuit adhered
to this long-standing tradition as recently as 2007 in e360 Insight v.
The Spamhaus Project. 49 Concluding that the district court abused its
discretion in entering a permanent injunction against defamation, the
Seventh Circuit stated, “[W]e note that there are sensitive First
Amendment issues presented in the context of permanent injunctions
in defamation actions. ‘Permanent injunctions—i.e., court orders that
actually forbid speech activities—are classic examples of prior
restraints.’” 50 Without reaching an opinion on the injunction’s
constitutional validity, the e360 court firmly reiterated that the only
remedy in defamation lawsuits is an action in damages. 51 Yet, many
trial courts are starting a new trend, issuing permanent injunctions
against specific statements that have been found to be defamatory by a
judge or jury.
46

Id. at 317.
See Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Erwin Chemerinsky et al. in Support of
Defendants-Appellants and Reversal, McCarthy v. Fuller, 810 F.3d 456 (7th Cir.
2015) (Nos. 14-3308, 15-1839), 2015 WL 4264749 [hereinafter Chemerinsky &
Lidsky Brief].
48
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 712 (1931).
49
e360 Insight v. The Spamhaus Project, 500 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2007).
50
Id. at 605–06 (quoting Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993).
The Court ultimately “expressed no opinion on the constitutional validity” of
narrow, injunctive relief, but instead vacated the injunction as overbroad. Id. at 606.
51
Id.
47
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III. THE MODERN TREND AWAY FROM THE TRADITIONAL RULE:
COURTS (ERRONEOUSLY) BEGIN TO ALLOW NARROW, PERMANENT
INJUNCTIONS IN DEFAMATION CASES
The traditional rule that equity will never enjoin a libel is quickly
becoming a maxim of the past. Today, some state and federal courts
are willing to enter narrow, permanent injunctions in defamation cases
where there has been a jury determination of the libelous nature of
certain statements. 52 In 1991, the Third Circuit determined that a
permanent injunction in a defamation case was impermissible under
Pennsylvania law, and noted that Missouri was the only state to allow
such a remedy for “the better part of this century.” 53 However, since
then, several state supreme courts and federal courts have followed
Missouri’s lead.
In Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, a California trial
court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendant from
making defamatory statements about plaintiff’s business. 54 The
Supreme Court of California, on appeal, held that the injunction issued
by the trial court was overly broad “but that defendant’s right to free
speech would not be infringed by a properly limited injunction
prohibiting defendant from repeating statements about plaintiff that
were determined at trial to be defamatory.” 55
In O’Brien v. University Community Tenants Union, a landlord
secured a jury determination that certain statements made by a
blacklisted tenants’ group were libelous, and then sought and obtained
an injunction against further libel. 56 The Supreme Court of Ohio
52

Wagner v. Equip. Co. v. Wood, 893 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (D.N.M. 2012); see
Hill v. Petrotech Resources Corp., 325 S.W.3d 302 (Ky. 2010); Balboa Island
Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339 (Cal. 2007), as modified (Apr. 26, 2007);
Advanced Training Sys., Inc. v. Caswell Equip. Co., Inc., 352 N.W.2d 1 (Minn.
1984); O’Brien v. Univ. Cmty. Tenants Union, Inc., 327 N.E.2d 753 (Ohio 1975);
Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 234 Ga. 765 (Ga. 1975);
53
Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 678 (3d Cir. 1991).
54
Lemen, 156 P.3d. at 341.
55
Id.
56
O’Brien, 327 N.E.2d at 753.
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affirmed the injunction, categorically finding that “[o]nce speech has
judicially been found libelous, if all the requirements for injunctive
relief are met, an injunction for restraint of continued publication of
that same speech may be proper.” 57
In Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, the Georgia Supreme Court
affirmed a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendant from
republishing libelous statements. 58 The court reasoned that the
injunction was not a prior restraint because, before the lower court
issued the injunction, it was adequately determined that the speech at
issue was not protected by the First Amendment. 59
Lastly, in Wagner Equipment Co. v. Wood, the District of New
Mexico upheld an injunction prohibiting Defendant buyers from
further defaming the Plaintiff’s logging operations business. 60
Defendants “undertook an email campaign to slander Plaintiff’s name
in the business community, making ‘several false and defamatory
statements’” injuring Plaintiff’s business reputation. 61 The district
judge reasoned that because defamation is unprotected speech, the
“’special vice’ of a prior restraint is non-existent where an injunction
is granted only as to statements previously adjudicated to be false.” 62
The reasoning in all four of these cases is erroneous. The
Balboa and O’Brien courts incorrectly relied on the Supreme Court’s
holding in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown 63 as a basis for concluding
that a permanent injunction in a defamation case does not violate the
First Amendment. In Kingsley, pamphleteers challenged a New York
criminal statute allowing the authorization of an injunction pendente

57

Id. at 755.
Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 234 Ga. 765 (Ga. 1975).
59
Id. at 778–79.
60
Wagner v. Equip. Co. v. Wood, 893 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1164 (D.N.M. 2012).
61
Id. at 1159.
62
Id. at 1161.
63
Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 346 (Cal. 2007), as
modified (Apr. 26, 2007); O’Brien v. Univ. Cmty. Tenants Union, Inc., 327 N.E.2d
753, 755 (Ohio 1975).
58
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lite while the matter at issue was being tried and adjudicated. 64 The
Supreme Court upheld the statute as constitutional. 65 Pendente lite is
Latin for “while the action is pending,” and such an injunction remains
in force—to preserve the status quo—only until the associated case is
decided. 66 An injunction pendente lite is, by definition, extinguished
when the associated case is decided, 67 and functions similar to a
temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction. 68
Additionally, Kingsley fits within one of the narrow exceptions to the
First Amendment’s ban on prior restraints: “the primary requirements
of decency may be enforced against obscene publications.” 69 Thus,
Kingsley’s reasoning is arguably inapplicable to cases involving
permanent injunctions on future publication of defamatory (nonpornographic) statements.
The Wagner and Retail Credit decisions were also flawed.
First, both courts justified entering a permanent injunction by, in part,
concluding that defamation is “unprotected speech.” 70 This is
incorrect. True, the Supreme Court has held that certain categories of
expression receive less protection under the First Amendment—
including obscenity, 71 defamation, 72 and fighting words. 73 But the
Supreme Court in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota noted that,
“Our decisions since the 1960’s have narrowed the scope of the

64

Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 440 (1957).
Id. at 443.
66
Pendente lite, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/pendente%20lite (last visited Feb. 17, 2016).
67
Kingsley, 354 U.S. at 439.
68
The Court itself in Kingsley referred to the injunction as “temporary.” Id. at
443 (“In the one case [the bookseller] may suffer fine and imprisonment for violation
of the criminal statute, in the other, for disobedience of the temporary injunction.”).
69
Id. at 440.
70
Wagner v. Equip. Co. v. Wood, 893 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1161–62 (D.N.M.
2012); Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 234 Ga. 765, 778 (Ga. 1975).
71
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
72
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
73
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
65
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traditional categorical exceptions for defamation . . . and for
obscenity.” 74 Significantly, the Court said,
We have sometimes said that these categories of expression
are not within the area of constitutionally protected speech, or
that the protection of the First Amendment does not extend to
them. Such statements must be taken in context, however,
and are no more literally true than is the occasionally
repeated shorthand characterizing obscenity ‘as not being
speech at all.’ What they mean is that these areas of speech
can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated
because of their constitutionally proscribable content
(obscenity, defamation, etc.)—not that they are categories of
speech entirely invisible to the Constitution . . . .75
Thus, the reasoning in Wagner and Retail Credit that defamation is
entirely unprotected is wrong. 76 Defamation is not entirely unprotected
by the First Amendment. Defamation does not, by its definition, ipso
facto allow courts to suppress future speech by way of injunction.
The Wagner and Retail Credit courts also inaccurately relied
on the Supreme Court’s decision in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Commission on Human Relations to conclude that injunctions against
defamation are permissible. 77 The ordinance at issue in Pittsburgh
forbade newspapers from publishing help-wanted advertisements in
sex-designated columns. 78 The purpose of the ordinance was to
74

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992).
Id. at 383–84 (1992) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
76
See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (extending
constitutional protection to an entire class of defamatory falsehoods that are uttered
without actual malice); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341
(1974) (“The First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to
protect speech that matters.”).
77
Wagner v. Equip. Co. v. Wood, 893 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1160–61 (D.N.M.
2012); Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 234 Ga. 765, 778–79 (Ga. 1975).
78
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376 (1973).
75
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proscribe discrimination in employment on the basis of sex and other
classes. 79 The Pittsburgh Commission issued a decision and order
finding that the Pittsburgh Press violated the ordinance, and required
Pittsburgh Press to cease and desist such violations and to utilize a
classification system with no reference to sex. 80 The Court held that
the Pittsburgh Commission’s order, narrowly drawn to prohibit
placement in sex-designated columns of advertisements for nonexempt
job opportunities, did not infringe the First Amendment. 81
First, it should be noted that Pittsburgh Press was not dealing
with an injunction at all, suggesting, like Kingsley, that its facts are
inapplicable in answering the question of whether permanently
enjoining defamatory speech is permissible. Second, the Supreme
Court upheld the Commission’s order entirely because the speech at
issue was commercial in nature. 82 It is well known that purely
commercial speech receives less protection under the First
Amendment than noncommercial speech, and regulations restricting
advertising about illegal products or services, or that is deceptive, can
be freely regulated. 83 Third, the ordinance at issue in Pittsburgh Press
can correctly be characterized as a “regulation” of harmful speech and,
as discussed supra, the Supreme Court has held that regulating
harmful speech is acceptable in many circumstances. 84 The Pittsburgh
Press court noted that discrimination in employment is illegal
79

Id. at 378.
Id. at 379.
81
Id. at 391.
82
Id. at 382 (“Our inquiry must therefore be whether the challenged order falls
within any of these exceptions.”).
83
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447
U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980).
84
Id; R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992).
As the press has evolved from an assortment of small printers into a diverse
aggregation including large publishing empires as well, the parallel growth and
complexity of the economy have led to extensive regulatory legislation from
which the publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity. Accordingly, this
Court has upheld application to the press of the National Labor Relations Act . .
. the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 382–83 (citations omitted).
80
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commercial activity under the ordinance and stated, “We have no
doubt that a newspaper constitutionally could be forbidden to publish a
want ad proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting prostitutes.” 85 The
ordinance merely affected the “make up” of the help-wanted section. 86
In contrast, issuing a permanent injunction against defamatory speech
is not a regulation; it is a blanket prohibition in perpetuity under all
contexts. Lastly, the Court pointed out that no suggestion was made
that “the Ordinance was passed with any purpose of muzzling or
curbing” speech, 87 and the Pittsburgh Press was still free to publish the
advertisements in a non-discriminatory manner. Conversely, a
permanent injunction is issued with the overt purpose of “muzzling or
curbing” speech, and it prohibits publishing such speech under any
circumstance.
The pitfalls of these four decisions underscore that the modern
trend to allow narrow, permanent injunctions in defamation cases
cannot be based in Supreme Court precedent or accurate
interpretations of such. Fortunately, most courts have resisted the
trend, standing by the wisdom of precedent and by the age-old maxim
that equity will not enjoin a libel. 88 However, in December 2015, the
Seventh Circuit became the second federal circuit to join the modern
movement in allowing narrow, permanent injunctions in defamation
cases.
85

Id. at 388.
Id. at 383.
87
Id.
88
Lan Sang v. Ming Hai, 951 F. Supp. 2d 504, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“For
almost a century the Second Circuit has subscribed to the majority view that, absent
extraordinary circumstances, injunctions should not ordinarily issue in defamation
cases . . . . Accordingly, while Plaintiff may continue to seek money damages, the
Court will not entertain her request for a permanent injunction.”) (citations omitted);
Oakley, Inc. v. McWilliams, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (C.D. Cal. 2012); Kramer v.
Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 679 (3d Cir. 1991) (concluding that the “jury
determination exception” in defamation cases was impermissible under Pennsylvania
law); Kinney v. Barnes, 443 S.W. 3d 87,91–92, 94–99 (Tex. 2014) (holding that a
permanent injunction as a remedy in a defamation case is an impermissible prior
restraint on speech under the Texas constitution, which the court noted is governed
by First Amendment standards).
86
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IV. MCCARTHY V. FULLER: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT BECOMES THE
SECOND CIRCUIT TO ALLOW NARROW, PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS IN
DEFAMATION CASES
In 1956, Catholic Sister Mary Ephrem launched a new program
of devotions called Our Lady of America. 89 Defendant Patricia Fuller
(“Fuller”), formerly known as Sister Therese, joined Our Lady of
America that same year. 90 In 1993, Sister Ephrem founded Our Lady
of America Center in Indianapolis, directing the Center until her death
in 2000, whereupon she willed all of her property, and the Center, to
Fuller. 91 In 2005, plaintiff Kevin McCarthy (“McCarthy”), a lawyer
and Catholic layman, and Albert Langsenkamp, another member of
the Catholic Church, met Fuller and committed to help her promote
the Center’s work. 92 The three worked together agreeably for
approximately two years, until 2007 when they had a falling out. 93
Langsenkamp and McCarthy established the Langsenkamp Family
Apostolate, and both claimed to be the authentic promoters of
devotions to Our Lady of America and to be the rightful owners of all
the documents and artifacts accumulated by Fuller and Sister
Ephrem. 94 Shortly thereafter, a retired postal inspector, Paul Hartman,
assisted Fuller in “launching a campaign to smear McCarthy’s and
Langsenkamp’s reputations.” 95 A bitter lawsuit ensued, and McCarthy
and Langsenkamp sued Fuller and Hartman for defamation in the
Southern District of Indiana. 96
89

McCarthy v. Fuller, 810 F.3d 456, 457 (7th Cir. 2015).
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 458. McCarthy also sued for conversion and fraud, and Fuller and
Hartman counterclaimed for theft, and copyright and trademark infringement, but
those issues are not relevant to this Comment.
90
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Jurors returned a verdict on March 11, 2014, finding both
Fuller and Hartman liable for defamation per se, and awarded
$100,000 in actual damages and $50,000 in punitive damages to
McCarthy, and $50,000 in actual damages and $1 million in punitive
damages for Langsenkamp. 97 The following month, McCarthy and
Langsenkamp filed a Motion for Injunction Against Further
Defamation with the district court.
A. District Court Holding
The District Court granted McCarthy and Langsenkamp’s
motion for permanent injunction against further defamation by the
Defendants. 98 In a mere footnote, District Judge Lawrence
“recognize[d] that there are First Amendment implications in
enjoining speech,” 99 but nevertheless summarily granted Plaintiffs’
motion, and amended the judgment to include injunctive relief,
because Defendants’ response was filed late and exceeded the page
limit set forth in the Court’s Local Rules. 100 The court did not conduct
a First Amendment analysis, nor did Judge Lawrence analyze whether
a permanent injunction was appropriate under the applicable fourfactor test that all Plaintiffs are required to satisfy in order to be
granted a permanent injunction. 101

97

McCarthy v. Fuller, 2014 WL 4248469 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 22, 2014) (verdict
and settlement summary).
98
McCarthy v. Fuller, No. 1:08-cv-994-WTL-DML, 2014 WL 4672394, at *7
(S.D. Ind. Sept. 18, 2014), rev’d and remanded, 810 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2015).
99
Id. at *7 n.7.
100
Id.
101
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (a
plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court
may grant injunctive relief: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate
for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff
and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would
not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”).
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The permanent injunction stated:
It is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that
Defendants Fuller and Hartman . . . are hereby
permanently enjoined from publishing the following
statements, as well as any similar statements that
contain the same sorts of allegations or inferences, in
any manner of forum . . . . 102
The judgment further ordered that Defendant Hartman take down the
website operated by him at ourladyofamerica.blogspot.com. 103
Defendants appealed, among other things, the entry of the permanent
injunction. 104

102

McCarthy, 810 F.3d at 460.
Id.
104
As discussed supra in Section II, the Supreme Court has passed down three
narrow exceptions to the ban on prior restraints of speech. None of those exceptions
apply to the statements at issue in McCarthy. The injunction banned Defendants’
statements that:
McCarthy suggested that Jim Whitta's name be forged on a quit claim deed;
Plaintiffs bribed various members of the Clergy (including Catholic Priests,
Bishops, Archbishops, Cardinals and Popes); McCarthy physically threatened
Fuller or otherwise committed any wrongful act against Fuller; Plaintiffs are
con-men, crooks, forgers, thieves, racketeers, or otherwise stole or converted
property from Fuller or engaged in any conspiracy against Fuller with any
Catholic clergy, lawyer (canon or civil) or investigator, or any Catholic lay
person promoting the devotion; Plaintiffs stole any statue (including the
Latrobe statue), crucifix, plaque, medallions, pins, gold coinage, website
(including the ourladyofamerica.com and ourladyofamerica.org web-sites)
and/or proceeds from Fuller's Key Bank Stock; Langsenkamp was involved in
a car chase in which he chased Fuller around Fostoria; Plaintiffs used the name
“Ron Norton” in an inflammatory email exchange that was first published by
Hartman at his website, ourladyofamerica.blogspot.com; and McCarthy,
without the knowledge or consent of Fuller, caused a will to be drafted for
Fuller in which she left the Devotion to McCarthy.
Id. at 460.
103
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B. The Appeal to the Seventh Circuit
Focusing almost exclusively on the breadth of the injunction
issued by the lower court, the Seventh Circuit vacated the injunction,
leaving it to the district judge to decide whether to issue a new
injunction consistent with Judge Posner’s criticisms. 105 The Seventh
Circuit had four main concerns with the injunction issued by the
district judge: (1) the jury did not specifically find which statements,
of the nine listed on the jury instruction, were defamatory; 106 (2) the
District Judge enjoined statements that the jury never even
considered; 107 (3) the indefiniteness of the preamble’s language did
not provide guidance for the injunction’s boundaries; 108 and (4) in
summarily granting the Plaintiffs’ motion and failing to consider
Defendants’—admittedly, waived and late—arguments, the lower
court failed to consider the public interest in issuing a broad
permanent injunction. 109
One jury instruction listed each of the nine statements that
plaintiffs claimed were made by the defendants and were
defamatory. 110 Judge Posner found it fatal to the injunction that the
jury was not asked which of these statements had been made by the
defendants and, of those statements, which were defamatory. 111 Since
the jury did not indicate which statements in the jury instruction it
found to be defamatory, the lower court had no basis for enjoining
statements that tracked this jury instruction. 112 The district judge also
enjoined statements that the jury was never even asked to consider. 113
For example, the judge permanently enjoined Defendants from stating
105

Id. at 463.
Id. at 460.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 461.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 459–60.
111
Id. at 460.
112
Id.
113
Id.
106
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that Plaintiffs had “committed any wrongful act against Fuller,” and
from calling the Plaintiffs “con-men, crooks, forgers, thieves,
racketeers, or [saying that they] otherwise stole or converted property
from Fuller or engaged in any conspiracy against Fuller with any
Catholic clergy, lawyer (canon or civil) or investigator, or any
Catholic law person promoting the devotion.” 114 Perhaps most
offensive to the First Amendment, the lower court also ordered
Defendant Hartman to take down his website, without making a
finding that everything published on the website defamed the
Plaintiffs. 115
Not surprisingly, the Seventh Circuit’s greatest criticism was
the language of the injunction’s preamble, enjoining “any similar
statements that contain the same sorts of allegations or inferences, in
any manner or forum.” 116 Judge Posner concluded that the injunction’s
preamble was a patent violation of the First Amendment. 117 The court
held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires injunctions to be
specific about the acts that they prohibit. 118 Vague language like
“similar” and “same sorts” does not provide guidance to the scope of
the injunction. 119 The court further conceded that forbidding
statements not yet determined to be defamatory, and the order
requiring Hartman to take down his website—which would prevent
him from posting any non-defamatory messages on his blog—would
unconstitutionally enjoin lawful speech. 120 The remainder of Judge
Posner’s First Amendment analysis, however, was minimal. He
quickly dismissed the argument that defamation can never be enjoined
because doing so would constitute a prior restraint on speech 121 by

114

Id.
Id. at 461.
116
Id. at 461, 463.
117
Id. at 463.
118
Id. at 461 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56).
119
Id.
120
Id. at 462.
121
Id.
115
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concluding that such a rule “would make an impecunious defamer
undeterrable.” 122
Whether the permanent injunction issued by the district court
was a violation of Fuller and Hartman’s First Amendment rights was
fiercely debated on appeal. The Seventh Circuit implicitly adopted the
rule that a narrow and limited injunction is allowed to prohibit a
defendant from reiterating the same, specific libelous statements. 123
Constitutional law professors and scholars Erwin Chemerinsky 124 and
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky125 filed an Amicus Brief in support of the
Defendants and in favor of reversal. Chemerinsky and Lidsky
concluded without hesitation that the First Amendment does not
permit permanent injunctions against defamatory speech. 126 To no
prevail, the Amici urged the Court to follow the “long-held rule” that
equity will not enjoin libel, and maintained that “[i]njunctions against
libelous speech, after a final judicial determination, are prior restraints
and cannot withstand the rigorous scrutiny due such orders.” 127

122

Id.
Id. (noting that, “Most courts would agree . . . [with the Sixth Circuit] that
defamatory statements can be enjoined . . . provided that the injunction is no
‘broader than necessary to provide relief to plaintiff while minimizing the restriction
of expression.’”) (citing Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 346
(Cal. 2007), as modified (Apr. 26, 2007)).
124
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky is the founding Dean and Distinguished
Professor of Law, and Raymond Pryke of Professor of First Amendment Law, at the
University of California, Irvine School of Law. He has frequently argued matters of
constitutional law in front of the nation’s highest courts, including United States
Supreme Court decisions involving injunctions in defamation cases. Chemerinsky &
Lidsky Brief, supra note 47 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980)..
125
Professor Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky is the Stephen O’Connor Professor of Law
and Associate Dean for International Programs at the Levin College of Law at the
University of Florida. Professor Lidsky is the author of a casebook entitled First
Amendment Law. She has also written extensively on issues of Internet free speech
and defamation. Id.
126
Id. at 4.
127
Id.
123
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Judge Sykes’ Concurring Opinion

Judge Diane Sykes concurred in judgment insofar as the
injunction was vacated for its indefinite and overbroad language. 128
She disagreed, however, with allowing the lower court to re-issue a
narrower injunction. 129 In this specific case, she thought the court was
ill equipped to fashion a constitutionally acceptable injunction because
the jury did not make a statement-specific finding on defamation. 130
The “equivalent of a general verdict that defendants are liable for
defamation” does not contain the necessary findings to support the
issuance of a permanent injunction. 131 Additionally, outside the
bounds of this specific case, Judge Sykes rejected the “emerging
modern trend” that allows for the possibility of narrowly tailored
permanent injunctive relief as a remedy for defamation as long as the
injunction prohibits only the repetition of the specific statements found
at trial to be false and defamatory. 132
V.

CRITICISMS OF MCCARTHY’S REASONING: JUDGE SYKES GOT
IT RIGHT

The reasoning in McCarthy shared many of the same flaws as
the state and federal trial courts discussed supra in Section III. Like
the Ohio Supreme Court in O’Brien and the California Supreme Court
in Balboa, the McCarthy majority mistakenly relied on Kingsley
Books, Inc. v. Brown to conclude that, while the “Supreme Court . . .
has not yet addressed the issue, . . . it has permitted injunctions
preventing other types of scurrilous speech.” 133 As Judge Sykes
correctly pointed out, temporarily enjoining dissemination of obscene
128

McCarthy v. Fuller, 810 F.3d 456, 463 (7th Cir. 2015) (Sykes, J.,
concurring).
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 464–66.
133
Id. at 462 (majority opinion).
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material is different from permanently enjoining defamatory speech. 134
She stated, “Defamation is materially different from obscenity.
There’s a meaningful distinction between [temporarily] enjoining the
distribution of a particular pamphlet once it’s been found to be
obscene and enjoining a person in perpetuity from uttering particular
words and phrases.” 135 Judge Sykes’ reasoning is directly on point
with Supreme Court precedent. In Kingsley, Justice Frankfurter
reconciled his holding with Near because the New York law in
Kingsley was “concerned solely with obscenity,” whereas the
Minnesota law in Near concerned matters “deemed to be
derogatory.” 136 It is evident that the Supreme Court has traditionally
treated obscenity and defamation differently, as reflected by the fact
that one of the three very narrow exceptions to the ban on prior
restraints is focused solely on obscene material. 137
Judge Sykes also argued that defamation is inherently
contextual in that a statement that is defamatory in one circumstance,
time, or place, might not be defamatory in another circumstance, time,
or place. 138 Permanent injunctions do not take into account these
contextual factors that change how speech is characterized. 139 Even a
permanent injunction limited to the exact words found to be
defamatory in one context might prohibit speech that would not be
actionable in another. A defamatory statement today, when spoken
tomorrow in a different time and in a particular context, may not be
defamatory for a number of reasons, and thus entitled to full
constitutional protection. 140 For example, the injunction in McCarthy
permanently prevented Defendants from stating, “McCarthy
physically threatened Fuller or otherwise committed any wrongful act
134

Id. at 465 (Sykes. J., concurring).
Id.
136
Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 445 (1957).
137
Supra section I.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 356 (Cal. 2007), as
modified (Apr. 26, 2007) (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
135
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against Fuller.” 141 This statement is incredibly broad, and it does not
take a vibrant imagination to think of a context where such statements,
if uttered, would not be defamatory—say, if McCarthy showed up at
Fuller’s home and physically threatened her with a baseball bat. 142
That is the problem with permanent injunctions: they permanently
prevent reiterating defamatory statements, even when reiterating the
statement would not constitute defamation.
In their Amici Brief, Chemerinsky and Lidsky expanded on
Judge Sykes’ point that defamation is inherently contextual. They
stated, “The richness of the English language and the myriad ways of
expressing any given thought make it impossible for a trial court to
craft an injunction against future defamatory speech that is both
effective and that does not also bar the publication of constitutionally
protected speech.” 143 In essence they argue that, for an injunction to be
effective, it will be overly broad because its parameters will be
impossible to determine, while a specific, narrowly tailored injunction
will be ineffective because defendants can just use different words to
get around it. 144 What is stopping a defendant, permanently enjoined
from uttering certain statements, from avoiding the injunction’s terms
by making the same point using different words? 145 This situation,
Chemerinsky and Lidsky argue, results in what is called a “revolvingdoor injunction.” 146 The plaintiff will then return to court to get a new
141

McCarthy, 810 F.3d at 459.
Chemerinsky and Lidsky illustrated a similar situation in their Amici Brief:
[A] statement that was once false may become true later in time. Suppose a
court, after finding that a defendant defamed a plaintiff by saying that the
plaintiff blackmailed her, issues a permanent injunction against the defendant’s
repeating any similar statements. If the plaintiff subsequently begins
blackmailing the defendant, the defendant would remain enjoined from saying
so, even though the statement would be true and hence constitutionally
protected.
Chemerinsky & Lidsky Brief, supra note 47, at *16
143
Id. at *4–5.
144
Id. at *12.
145
Id. at *14.
146
Id. at *14–15.
142

295

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2016

25

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 7

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 11, Issue 2

Spring 2016

injunction prohibiting the more recent statements from being
uttered. 147 If the modern trend continues to expand, revolving-door
injunctions will become particularly common since the Internet allows
for the rapid publication of opinions, and courts will potentially be
forced to modify injunctions over and over. Thus, permanent
injunctions do not take into account changed circumstances or
contextual factors, rendering both broad and narrow injunctions
unconstitutional prior restraints, and ineffective remedies for a
defamed plaintiff.
VI. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AGAINST ISSUING INJUNCTIONS
A.

Money Damages Are Adequate to Compensate Defamed
Plaintiffs

In McCarthy v. Fuller, the Seventh Circuit observed that
permanently enjoining defamation might be required in some cases. 148
Surprisingly, Judge Posner defended this holding almost exclusively
on the assumption that plaintiffs would (potentially) be left remediless
against insolvent defendants. 149 Disagreeing with the customary rule
that equity will not enjoin a libel, Judge Posner stated, “The problem
with such a rule is that it would make an impecunious defamer
undeterrable.” 150 “He would continue defaming the plaintiff, who after
discovering that the defamer was judgment proof would cease suing,
as he would have nothing to gain from the suit, even if he won a
judgment.” 151 As applied to the facts of McCarthy, Judge Posner held
that it was “beyond unlikely” that Fuller and Hartman could pay the
judgment against them. 152 “They will be broke, and if defamation can

147

Id.
McCarthy v. Fuller, 810 F.3d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 2015).
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
148
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never be enjoined, they will be free to repeat all their defamatory
statements with impunity.” 153
Apparently, the McCarthy majority was concerned that
McCarthy and Langsenkamp (and other plaintiffs in the future) would
have no remedy because all they would obtain is an uncollectible
money judgment. 154 This reasoning is curious, however, because many
defendants—in tort and contract lawsuits, for example—are, or
become, judgment proof, 155 and the usual remedy for defamation has
always been damages. 156 Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
compensated plaintiffs whose constitutional rights have been violated
with monetary damages. 157 Moreover, in lawsuits outside the realm of
defamation where plaintiffs often request injunctive relief (e.g.,
copyright infringement cases), few courts are willing to consider
insolvency as a factor in determining whether an injunction should be
issued. 158

153

Id.
Id.
155
Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE. L. REV.
603, 606 (2006) (Noting that when tort claims are large enough to litigate, many
Americans are judgment proof, lacking sufficient assets to pay the judgment in full).
156
See Alberti v. Cruise, 383 F.2d 268, 272 (4th Cir. 1967) (“There is usually
an adequate remedy at law which may be pursued in seeking redress from
harassment and defamation.”); Karhani v. Meijer, 270 F.Supp.2d 926, 930 (E.D.
Mich. 2003); Kessler v. General Servs. Admin., 236 F.Supp. 693, 698 (S.D.N.Y.
1964), aff’d per curiam, 341 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1964) (refusing to enter an injunction
against libel because, “As a general rule, a court will not issue an injunction to
restrain torts against the person, since the remedy at law is adequate.”).
157
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991) (damages resulting from § 1983
violations against individuals); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (damages
awards under Civil Rights Act of 1871 governed by principle of compensation);
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agent, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (action for
damages directly under Fourth Amendment).
158
See Weinstein v. Aisenberg, 758 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.)
dismissed, 767 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 2000) (“Even where the party seeking injunctive
relief alleges that the opposing party may dissipate bank assets, a judgment for
money damages is adequate and injunctive relief is improper, notwithstanding the
possibility that a money judgment will be uncollectible.”).
154
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This is not to say that a reputation has a price tag; to the
contrary, sometimes money damages, no matter how high, can never
make a plaintiff whole again. But “the law often relies on monetary
damages to partially recompense a loss even when those damages
cannot perfectly repair the damage done.” 159 Fox Sports Broadcaster
Erin Andrews was recently awarded $55 million in damages—an
award she likely will never receive in full. 160 Andrews’ stalker,
defendant Michael David Barrett, surreptitiously videotaped her
through a peephole in the privacy of Andrews’ own hotel room and
posted nude videos of her on the Internet for millions of viewers to
see. 161 $28 of the $55 million judgment was assigned to Barrett
individually (the rest was assigned to the hotels that were negligent in
protecting Andrews’ privacy). 162 Many journalists have surmised that
if Andrews receives any money from Barrett, it will likely be a very
small amount. 163 Similarly, in wrongful death cases, courts frequently
place a “price tag” on the plaintiff’s harm, when in reality no amount
of money can remedy the wrongful loss of life. 164 Andrews was
demeaned, embarrassed, and violated when nude photographs were
posted, without her consent, on the Internet. The loved ones of a
wrongfully killed individual are undoubtedly permanently wounded.
And defamed plaintiffs, like McCarthy and Langsenkamp, may never
get their good reputation back. Nevertheless, money damages have
159

Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Interlace Medical, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 2d 69, 78 (D.
Mass. 2013).
160
Stacey Barchenger, Erin Andrews Lawsuit: How Much of $55M Judgment
Will She Get?, TENNESSEAN (Mar. 9, 2016),
http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2016/03/09/how-much-55m-judgment-erinandrews-get/81500906/ (“Barrett is what is known in the legal realm as ‘judgment
proof;’ meaning he has no assets from which Andrews can collect money.”);
Michael McCann, Will Erin Andrews be Paid the $55M She Was Awarded in
Lawsuit?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.si.com/moresports/2016/03/07/erin-andrews-wins-55-million-hotel-lawsuit.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id. (noting that the average award for the wrongful death of an adult female
is $3 million).
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always compensated in-compensable harms, and the First
Amendment’s protection should not turn on whether a defendant is
judgment proof. The McCarthy reasoning wrongly implies that the
right to be free from prior restraints on speech stops at cases with
insolvent defendants. 165 In light of the dangers of infringing First
Amendment rights, the scale should tilt in favor of money damages
over an injunction.
B.

The Public Interest is Disserved When Courts Issue a
Permanent Injunction in Defamation Cases: The Potential
Chilling of Free Speech

Perhaps the most obvious consequence of this modern trend is
the potential chilling of free and legitimate speech. Unlike subsequent
punishment for defamation or harmful speech activity, the prior
restraint of speech before it occurs deprives the public of information
that should otherwise be disseminated. Each time a court enters a
permanent injunction in a defamation case in favor of one plaintiff,
everyone’s constitutional right to free speech is eroded. The Seventh
Circuit permitted the district court to issue a narrow, permanent
injunction against only the specific statements that have been found to
be defamatory. 166 Whether an injunction could permissibly be issued,
according to the McCarthy majority, turned on the breadth of the
injunction and what exactly it enjoined. 167 However, a permanent
injunction, no matter how specific, sweeps free speech within its
confines making the breadth of the injunction immaterial under a First
Amendment analysis.
In refusing to issue a temporary restraining order against
defendant’s distributing offensive pamphlets, the Eastern District of
Michigan in its 2003 decision Karhani v. Meijer recognized that the
breadth of the injunction played no role in the Supreme Court’s
165

McCarthy v. Fuller, 810 F.3d 456, 466 (7th Cir. 2015) (Sykes, J.,
concurring).
166
Id. at 463 (majority opinion).
167
Id.
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decision in Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe. 168 The plaintiff
in Karhani attempted to persuade the court that the temporary
restraining order was permissible because it was extremely limited in
its scope. 169 The district court was unconvinced, observing that the
Supreme Court in Keefe “was simply concerned with the
impermissible restraint on First Amendment speech caused by the
prior restraint imposed by the state courts.” 170 Indeed, like the
preamble of the injunction at issue in McCarthy, the broad language of
the injunction issued in Keefe proved fatal. In Keefe, the Illinois trial
court entered an injunction enjoining petitioners from passing out
pamphlets, leaflets or literature “of any kind”. 171 Unlike the Seventh
Circuit in McCarthy, though, the Keefe and Karhani courts did not
remand to the district court with the possibility to fabricate a narrower
injunction. 172 Instead, the Supreme Court firmly concluded that “[n]o
prior decisions support the claim that the interest of an individual in
being free from public criticism of his business practices in pamphlets
or leaflets warrants use of the injunctive power of a court,” 173 and
vacated the injunction.
Similarly, in Kinney v. Barnes, the Texas Supreme Court held
that requesting an injunction on future speech was “the essence of
prior restraint[.]” 174 The plaintiff in Kinney filed a defamation lawsuit
regarding defamatory online posts and requested a permanent
injunction on any similar future statements. 175 The Texas Supreme
Court refused to prohibit future speech based on adjudication that

168

Karhani v. Meijer, 270 F. Supp. 2d 926, 933 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
Id.
170
Id.
171
Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 417 (1971) (emphasis
added).
172
Id. at 420; Karhani, 270 F.Supp.2d at 930.
173
Keefe, 402 U.S. at 419 (emphasis added).
174
Kinney v. Barnes, 443 S.W.3d 87, 93 (Tex. 2014).
175
Id. at 89.
169
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certain statements were defamatory because doing so would
impermissibly threaten to chill protected speech. 176
Injunctions are an incredibly powerful tool. Injunctions
frequently have consequences so sweeping that they shut down
operating businesses or otherwise dramatically affect the rights of the
parties involved in an irreversible manner. “Put simply, injunction
proceedings are high stakes poker.” 177 The Supreme Court has
reiterated that courts must “pay particular regard for the public
consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of
injunction.” 178 The public consequences are most severe in the First
Amendment context, as this modern trend has the effect of potentially
chilling lawful and legitimate speech.
CONCLUSION
On March 29, 2016, Fuller filed a petition for certiorari with
the United States Supreme Court. 179 Her petition was denied on April
25. 180 Our society relies on the Internet as its main platform for
communication. The intense debates surrounding net neutrality in the
upcoming presidential elections show how important many people
believe it is to preserve every citizen’s right to communicate freely
online. But more Internet communication likely means more
defamation lawsuits. 181 Thus, it is imperative that the Supreme Court

176

Id. at 101.
Mark D. Bradshaw, White Paper, Injunctions—A Practical Guide to One of
the Law’s Most Powerful Tools, STEVENS & LEE (Jan. 1, 2002),
http://www.stevenslee.com/injunctions-a-practical-guide-to-one-of-the-laws-mostpowerful-tools/.
178
Winter v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008).
179
McCarthy v. Fuller, 810 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed,
(U.S. Mar. 29, 2016) (No. 15-212).
180
Fuller v. Langsenkamp, 136 S.Ct. 1726 (2016).
181
See, e.g., Laura Parker, Jury Awards $11.3M over Defamatory Internet
Posts, USA TODAY (Oct. 11, 2006, 10:53 AM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-10-10-internet-defamation177
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determine whether injunctions against defamation violate the First
Amendment’s prohibition on prior restraints.
As this Comment highlights, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
struck down injunctions against harmful speech. 182 Prior restraints are
the least tolerable infringements on First Amendment rights. Thus, this
modern trend does not appear to comport with precedent. Moreover, as
Chemerinsky and Lidsky make clear from a practical point of view,
injunctions against defamation—no matter how narrow or broad—just
do not work. The context-dependence of defamation renders injunctive
relief against it both ineffective and blatantly unconstitutional. Lastly,
public policy (and tradition) dictates that money damages are adequate
to remedy a defamed plaintiff. Judge Posner’s concern about the
infamous undeterrable, insolvent defendant cannot justify the entrance
of a remedy that infringes First Amendment rights. The American
judicial system has long used money damages to compensate incompensable harms including wrongful death and violations of
citizens’ constitutional rights. And, most importantly, injunctions
against defamation have the effect of chilling free speech. There is a
profound national interest in the uninhibited debate of issues. The
imperfection of our legal system requires us to protect defamation, not
because it is inherently worth protecting, but so we can ensure that
legitimate and lawful speech is not mistakenly penalized. 183 Thus, the
modern trend to issue permanent injunctions against defamation must
be stopped.

case_x.htm (positing that this case could represent a coming trend in court fights
over online messages).
182
See Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980); Org. for a
Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson,
283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931).
183
Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the
Chilling Effect, COLL. OF WILLIAM & MARY LAW SCH., SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY
707 (1978).
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